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Abstract
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and
report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features
of two extant but very dierent auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design
(see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of
Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to
create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process,
which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple
and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher eciencies,
lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the
complexity of a bidder’s problem.
1 Introduction
What is the best way to sell a collection of objects with diverse complementary qualities?
In spite of the fact that this has become an important public policy question1 and in spite
of the fact that good answers may have signicant prot potential in the private sector,
it remains unanswered. Although there have been many suggestions, neither theory, nor
experiment, nor practical application has provided a denitive design.
The theory has proven intractable. The most successful models of auctions have been
typically built upon an assumption that each agents’ preferences, for the objects being
auctioned, are independent; an agent’s valuation of one object is not aected by whether
she obtains any other object in the auction. When these models are relevant, there is
an impressive body of theory describing auctions which maximize eciency and seller
revenue (see Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982),
Vickery (1961)). There has also recently been some exciting progress on models which
allow agents to have dependent preferences for multiple homogeneous items (see Ausubel
(1997), Noussair (1995), Ausubel and Cramton (1998), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
1See Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Fall 1997 special issue
(1998)). But when the items to be auctioned are heterogeneous with complementarities,
the standard methods of analysis have not been particularly successful.2 There is, as far
as we now know, no complete solution to the optimal auction problem for environments
with two or more heterogeneous items and complementarities. There is also no general
solution or characterization of equilibrium (either game theoretic or market equilibrium)
for common auctions (rst-price, second-price, etc.) in these environments. Even the
simplest two good models have led to complex solutions (see for example Armstrong
(1998)).
Because of the potential benets or prots, one would hope that some sellers in the
marketplace would experiment with new multiple-item auction designs that we might
learn from. But there have been few. The FCC spectrum auctions are a well known
and courageous example. Sears Logistics was another early pioneer. This dearth of
risk-takers may have been partly due to the lack of computational and network support
necessary to create new designs, a constraint that no longer applies. But even when
auctions occur in practice it is dicult if not impossible to learn much other than that
they work. Because the true values of the items to the bidders are unknowable, it is
not possible to measure such important performance indicators as eciency, maximum
possible revenue, or bidder losses.
So if progress is to be made in studying complex auctions in complex environments, we
must turn to the laboratory. The use of the laboratory as a testbed for complex auctions
in complex environments began with Ferejohn et al. (1979), Smith (1979), Grether et al.
(1981) and Rassenti et al. (1982). This methodology has proven to be fairly successful in
providing guidance for the design of a variety of implemented auctions (See Plott (1997),
Ishikida et al. (1998), Ledyard et al. (1997)). Building on knowledge from theoretical
and practical experience, one can create testbed environments in the lab which exhibit
as much complexity or simplicity as one wishes. In these environments, one can test any
auction. With laboratory control, one can calculate performance measures unknowable
in the eld. One can precisely answer questions such as: did the highest value bidders
win the items, was there a bidder who wanted a particular conguration and did not get
it, and were there bidders who, because of the auction design, bid more for an item than
it was truly worth to them?
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report
on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but
very dierent auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the
Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding
one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation
Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demon-
strate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher
eciencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the
complexity of a bidder’s problem.
2See for example Armstrong (1998), Bikhchandani and Ostroy (1998), Gu¨l and Stacchetti (1995),
Bykowsky et al. (1995).
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Table 1: Auction Designs
FCC AUSM OTHERS
1. iterative continuous sealed-bid
2. only 1 item bids package bids allowed OR bids, Vickery bids
complex contingent bids
3. pay what you bid pay what you bid Vikrey prices
competitive prices
4. maximize revenue maximize revenue increase revenue
to nd winners to nd winners
5. resubmit winners resubmit winners withdraw any bids
resubmit all
6. minimum increments submit any bid max # of bids
xed packages only
7. eligibility based stopping auctioneer stopping random stopping
% increase in surplus
8. all bids revealed winners revealed queries - What do I need
public queue revealed to bid to win?
In Section 2, we describe the background of our search for a high performance multi-
object auction design. In section 3, we formally describe the Milgrom FCC process and
the RAD auction. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the testbed and the performance
measures we use to evaluate the design. In Section 6, our ndings are oered. Finally,
in Section 7, we provide our conclusions and work that remains to be done.
2 The Context
To understand the possibilities and choices facing the designer of multi-object auctions,
we begin by recalling the key features of two vastly dierent designs: the Milgrom FCC
design (see Milgrom (1995)) and AUSM (see Banks et al. (1989)). We have listed, in
Table 1, the main gross design features of each auction plus some others of interest.
The Milgrom FCC design requires single item bids, is iterative (i.e. bids are submitted
in synchronous rounds), and has an eligibility based stopping rule (i.e., a use-it-or-lose-it
feature) driven by a minimum increment requirement for new bids. AUSM allows package
bids, is continuous (i.e. allows bids to be submitted asynchronously), and has an auction-
eer based stopping rule. Three aspects of the design are the same for each. Each winning
bidder pays what they bid, provisionally winning bids are determined by maximizing po-
tential revenue subject to feasibility, and provisionally winning bids remain as a standing
commitment until replaced by another provisional winner. Nevertheless, it is hard to
imagine two more dierent designs other than, perhaps, a sealed bid generalization of a
Vickery auction.3
3As most theorists realize, it is pretty easy to describe the demand-revealing auction for this problem.
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Each auction represents a compromise which is the result of a sequence of choices
of design characteristics. Each choice often leads to one side of a seeming unavoidable
trade-o. Therefore each auction process has its potential weaknesses. In this paper we
focus on potential failures in performance in the areas of eciency, revenue, bidder losses,
complexity, biases and the time to complete an auction.
In most discussions of the design of multi-object auctions, the primary goals have
either explicitly or implicitly been high eciency and/or high revenue. So we begin
with these. It is important to realize, however, that there is no fundamental conflict
between eciency and revenue. In fact, in single item auctions, maximal revenue usually
occurs by maximizing eciency and then extracting as much of the surplus as possible
(Myerson (1981)). It remains to be proven however that this approach works in multi-
object auctions.4 In environments without income eects,5 what trade-o there is can be
most easily seen in the following identity:
Eciency  Maximal Possible Surplus = Revenue + Bidders Prots.
High eciency and low revenue can occur if and only if bidder prots are high. And high
revenue and low eciency can occur if and only if bidders have losses.
Both the FCC and AUSM auction processes have a dicult time consistently gen-
erating 100% eciency across a variety of environments (See Ledyard et al. (1997),
Kwasnica et al. (1998)). The Milgrom FCC mechanism, because it only allows single
item bids, faces the exposure problem.6 This causes losses for bidders, who pay too much
for stand-alone items, or low eciencies and revenue, when bidders who want packages
stop bidding to protect themselves from losses. To combat the exposure problem, the
FCC allowed provisional winners to withdraw with a penalty. Porter (1997) analyzes the
eect of this rule and nds that although eciencies are indeed higher, so are bidder
losses. The AUSM mechanism, because it allows package bids, controls bidder losses
but faces the threshold problem7. This causes low eciencies as collections of small bid-
ders may not be able to coordinate their bids to dislodge a large, inecient bidder. To
combat the threshold problem, AUSM is often used with a standby queue { a public
But if K items are being auctioned, each agent’s bid would need to be 2K numbers { potentially creating
a very large, very complex problem. Further, if there is any aliation in the values of bidders then sealed
bid auctions are thought to be less ecient than auctions which allow bidders to learn as they run (See
Milgrom and Weber (1982)). Rassenti et al. (1982) proposed a less complex variation of a sealed bid
auction for multiple items with synergies, but it has never been tested in the complex testbed we use
below.
4In spite of Williams (1994) who identies the optimal, ecient auction to be a Vickery-Groves
mechanism, we do not know that the optimal auction is always ecient. In fact Armstrong (1998)
suggests it may not be so. But, intuitively, the principle should hold most of the time.
5This is a world of quasi-linear utility{the only world in which auctions are usually studied.
6We have included in Appendix A.1, a detailed description of the exposure problem for the interested
reader. It can be skipped without a complete loss of understanding.
7We have also included, in Appendix A.2, a detailed description of the threshold problem for the
interested reader. It can also be skipped
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bulletin board on which potentially combinable bids can be displayed.8 Unfortunately,
many consider the queue to be a complexity that creates real diculties for bidders.
While it is easy to measure eciency, revenue and bidder losses, it is harder to mea-
sure the complexity of a mechanism or the costs of the length of time to complete.
Nevertheless, we can make a few observations about the FCC and AUSM performance in
these areas. Because the Milgrom FCC auction proceeds in measured steps and because
bidders seem to have a relatively simple information processing problem at each step,
most consider it a \simple" mechanism.9 But, because of this slow but steady approach,
FCC auctions can take a very long time to complete. Contrarily, AUSM proceeds in an
apparent disorganized manner with bids allowed in any order, stopping when no new bids
are forthcoming. Because of this, AUSM nishes quickly. But many feel that this places a
dicult information processing burden on bidders that, together with the standby queue,
makes AUSM a very \complex" mechanism.
So each mechanism has both desirable and undesirable performance characteristics.
The obvious question then is: can we do better than both? In particular can we take
the successful design aspects of each, perhaps augment them a bit, and create a hybrid
that dominates both? Based on the research reported in this paper, we suggest that the
answer is yes.
The challenge is to take what we have learned from our experience with both the
AUSM and Milgrom FCC designs and to create something better. To do so requires a
series of choices of design features. Here we explain the choices we made to end up with
the better performing RAD mechanism.
1. Use an iterative process. There are continuous versions of the Milgrom rules (Plott
(1997)) and there are iterative versions of AUSM.10 So one could go either way at this
point. But we take the complexity problem seriously. It is likely that, as long as one
doesn’t have to give up too much in other performance dimensions, running an iterative
auction is cognitively easier for bidders. Another benet for participants, software, and
network communications is that iterative auctions give time to process information. One
is not disadvantaged if one has a slow computer or modem.
2. Allow package bidding. One could require single-item bidding as in the Milgrom FCC
auction, and then augment and change the other rules to try to improve eciency, time
to complete, etc. 11 Or one can accept package bidding as in AUSM and then try to
make it work as well as possible. Since one of the main observations from the work in
8It is shown in Banks et al. (1989) that the queue increases both eciency and revenue in continuous
auctions.
9For even this \simple" mechanism, however, the rules are incredibly detailed and complex.(See FCC’s
Third Report and Order and Fifth Report and Order).
10See Kwasnica et al. (1998) who showed that an iterative package bidding mechanism is possible.
11Along these lines, Porter (1997) analyzes the eect of a withdrawal rule designed to reduce losses
and improve eciency. Kwasnica et al. (1998) analyze the eect of alternative stopping rules. Neither
withdrawal rules nor stopping rules seem to matter much.
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Kwasnica et al. (1998) and Ledyard et al. (1997) is that package bidding really matters
if one wants high eciencies, we choose to accept package bidding.
3. Do not use a standby queue. There is one big ancillary benet from using an iterative,
package bidding auction. In continuous package bidding auctions like AUSM, a standby
queue has proven to be very useful to combat the threshold problem. Unfortunately,
many think a standby queue creates too much complexity for bidders. But the work of
Kwasnica et al. (1998) suggests that a queue may be unnecessary. It was generally unused
in their tests of iterative, package bidding auctions. In those experiments, eciency, time
to complete and revenue were essentially the same whether or not a queue was available
to bidders. It is easy to see why this would be true. In a continuous auction, bids
are considered as they arrive, one at a time, so to overcome a threshold problem there
has to be a way to accumulate bids that, only together, can replace a standing bid.
In iterative auctions, all bids are simultaneously considered so separate accumulating
is unnecessary. The complexity facing the bidder in AUSM disappears in an iterative
auction. It is replaced, as we will see below, by a more complex, but hidden, calculation
by the auctioneer.
4. Pay what you bid. The Milgrom FCC design and AUSM both have this property as
do many iterative auctions. The alternatives involve some type of second price scheme.
Although second price mechanisms may be theoretically better with respect to incentive
compatibility, experimental evidence suggests that it takes subjects time and experience
to learn to play the dominant strategies and so, at least for a while, eciencies can be
low.12 Further, auctioneers seem loathe to have it publicly known that they left money
on the table. We have some designs for auctions based on competitive prices like those
in the two-sided combinatorial market in Ishikida et al. (1998), but testing remains as
future research.
5. Winning bids maximize revenue. Provisionally winning bids are selected by con-
sidering all bids and selecting those that would produce the most revenue subject to
feasibility. In single unit auctions, this is equivalent to awarding the item to the highest
bidder. It means that any bidder has a higher probability of winning if they bid higher {
no matter what collection of items they are bidding on. This is an important and natural
requirement for incentive compatibility.
6. Provisionally winning bids are automatically resubmitted. Any provisionally winning
bid must remain standing until it loses. Our experience is that, unless a bid is a bind-
ing commitment, bidders will use the opportunity to create noise and performance will
drop.13 Without commitment, bids do not convey willingness to pay information. With-
out commitment the auction is really a ta^tonnenment and bidders can veto potential
equilibria at no cost to themselves by simply changing their bids. Much mischief ensues.
In the FCC auctions, withdrawal of provisionally winning bids was allowed at a penalty,
12See the discussion of failure of subjects to understand their dominant strategy in second-price auc-
tions (Kagel et al. (1987)).
13See, for example, the performance problems of the iterative Vickery-Groves mechanism in Banks
et al. (1989).
6
and it became a strategic variable, often used to keep the auction going or to signal
a willingness to coordinate bids with others. Little is gained and much is lost by not
requiring bids to be real commitments.
7. Use eligibility based stopping rules. The design of stopping rules is an area much in
need of serious theoretical and experimental research. There are many options to choose
from. The Sears Logistics auction used a rule based on the increase in revenue between
rounds. Some auctions simply leave it up to the auctioneer to choose (an auctioneer
based rule). Both have political problems since important bidders may lie in wait, not
bidding until they see what their opponents intend to do, understanding that a little
quiet lobbying of the auctioneer (oering a much higher bid next iteration) will prevent
the auction from stopping before they get a chance to bid. Obviously these are the wrong
incentives for an active, serious, and speedy auction. A third option is a random stopping
rule - increasing the probability of stopping over time. This has the same problem as both
the auctioneer based rule and paying the second highest price in that there may be serious
ex post regrets. If the random draw says stop early in the iterations, the auctioneer and
the bidders will try very hard to nd a way to ignore that outcome and continue. A lot
of political hay will be reaped over "leaving too much money on the table". Since all of
the above rules have potential problems, the FCC adopted an eligibility based stopping
rule { the truly unique part of the Milgrom design.
We do have some evidence although not much. Kwasnica et al. (1998) tried various soft
stopping rules for an iterative package bidding auction and found little eect on eciency
or time to completion. Based largely on those ndings, we decided not to experiment with
this part of the design and to adopt the Milgrom rules, including activity and minimum
bid increment rules. This enables us to isolate the gains in speed we can achieve from
package bidding and to show that one can integrate package bidding and eligibility based
stopping. We gured that if we were successful in improving performance that way, we
could always return to study stopping rules later.
8. Display winning bids and single item prices after each round. The FCC auction
displayed all bids in all rounds and identied the bidders by ID number. There is some
reason to believe that this may lead to attempts to strategize in a non-productive way
(See Cramton and Schwartz (1998)). We choose to display only the winning bids.
At this point, with our eight choices we have, in fact, selected the Milgrom FCC rules
with two changes: allow package bids and publicly display only the provisionally winning
bids. One new additional feature is necessary to implement this auction. We need to
provide a method of computing, from bids, a vector of single item prices that can be used
to check minimum bid increment requirements and to guide bidders to bid in a manner
that will overcome thresholds. We provide such an algorithm in the next section.
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3 The Auctions
Iterative auctions proceed in a series of rounds. Bids are made synchronously. The auc-
tioneer processes the bids, identies provisionally winning bids, and provides information
to the bidders. The process repeats until a stopping rule takes force. Readers familiar
with mechanism design theory will recognize an iterative auction as a special case of a
resource allocation process as originally described by Hurwicz (1960). Readers familiar
with experimental economics will recognize an iterative auction as a special case of a
microeconomic system as originally described by Smith (1982).
Rather than providing a fully general framework, in this paper we will focus on the
designs we evaluate. Let I = f1, . . . , Ng represent the set of bidders, K = f1, . . . , Kg
represent the set of objects to be sold and t = 1, 2, 3, . . . represent the iterations or rounds.
In general, a bid can be a very abstract entity involving complex contingent logic.14 In
this paper, we restrict our attention to very simple bids. A bid is b = (p, x) where p 2 R+
represents the bid price and x 2 f0, 1gK represents the items desired.15 A bid signies
\I am willing to pay up to p for the collection of objects for which xk = 1 if I get all of
them." As such it represents a contingent oer.
Begin by assuming we are in round t and all i have submitted their bids. Let Bit =
f(pij, xij)gJj=1 be the set of i’s bids and let Bt = [iIBit be the set of submitted bids at t.
Both the Milgrom FCC and RAD designs use a straight-forward allocation rule: award
the items (provisionally) to that collection of bids which would yield the highest revenue.
We solve the following allocation problem:
max
∑
j2Bt
pjδj (1)
subject to
δj 2 f0, 1g for all j 2 Bt
and ∑
j2Bt
xjkδ
j  1 for all k = 1, . . . , K.
If there is only single-item bidding, this simply selects the highest bidder for each item.
With package bidding it is a bit more complex but still a straight-forward version of the
AUSM rule.16
Let δt be the solution to this problem.
17 If δjt = 1 we say j is a provisionally winning
14See, for example, Ishikida et al. (1998), Rassenti et al. (1982) and Grether et al. (1981).
15This structure can easily be generalized to cases where there are multiple-copies of items available.
In this paper, however, we treat each k = 1, . . . , K as a single indivisible object.
16If the number of bidders and objects is large, since the optimization problem is NP-complete, in
practice it can potentially take a long time to solve the allocation problem. There are ways to address
this potential diculty but, since computation was never an issue in any of the results reported in this
paper, we defer such exposition to later papers.
17There may be multiple-solutions to this problem, known as ties. If so a tie-breaking procedure is
used.
8
bid in round t. Let Wt = f(pj, xj) 2 Bt j δjt = 1g. Then i’s winning bids are the set
W it  Bit \ Wt. Obviously W0 = ;.
If the auction stops at this point, for each j 2 W it , i will receive the items for which
xk = 1 and will pay pj to the auctioneer. If the auction does not stop, then all winners
are automatically resubmitted in round t + 1. That is,
W it  Bit+1 for all i. (2)
At this point we have described the rst six items from our design choices in Section 2.
We turn now to items 7 and 8 { eligibility-based stopping. Introduced by Paul Milgrom
as the truly unique part of his FCC design, it is designed to encourage active bidding and
a soft close (not stopping too fast) so that an ecient allocation can be found. Eligibility
limits the number of items a bidder can bid on in a round as a function of one’s past
bidding behavior. To explain eligibility we need the concept of an active bid in round
t− 1. A bid is active in t− 1 if it was either required to be resubmitted from round t− 2,
as it would if it were a winning bid, or it was voluntarily submitted in t − 1 as a new
bid. A bidder’s eligibility is exactly the number of objects on which he had active bids
in t − 1.18 We indicate this number by Ait−1. A collection of bids Bit for i at t satises
eligibility if and only if ∑
k2K
∑
j2Bit
xijk  Ait−1 (3)
where
Ai0 = K
and
Ait = #fk j (p, x) 2 Bit and xik = 1g
That is, a collection of bids is eligible if and only if the new bids plus last round’s winning
bids are placed on no more than Ait−1 objects. It is easy to see that eligibility can be
checked incrementally as each new bid is oered. It serves as a \use it or lose it" rule.
The stopping rule is obvious once eligibility is imposed.
Stop at the end of t if
∑
i2I
Ait  K. (4)
To drive the auction to nish we also need to force new bids to be serious. Otherwise,
a bidder could repeatedly submit a bid of 1 for the package of all items. Then, Ait = K
and the auction never ends. So a minimum increment rule is imposed based on a vector
18In the FCC spectrum auctions, a weighted measure of eligibility was used. Objects were weighted by
their MHz Pops. Let wk be the weight assigned to k. Let αit−1 = fkjihas an active bid onkin roundt−1g.
A bidder’s eligibility in t is then Ait−1 =
∑
k2αit−1 wk. A collection of bids B
i
t for i at t satises weighted
eligibility if and only if
∑
k
∑
j2Bit x
ij
k wk  Ait−1 where Ai0 =
∑
k wk.
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of single-item prices t which are known at the start of round t.19 Let N it = B
i
t n W it−1
be the set of new bids. Then we require that
pij 
∑
k2K
xijk (
t
k + M) for all (p, x) 2 N it . (5)
where M is a minimum bid increment chosen by the auctioneer.20
So at the start of each round, t  0, each i 2 I knows K, t, W it−1, and Ait−1. Each i
then chooses N it satisfying (3) and (5). By (2) B
i
t = W
i
t−1 [N it . Using (1) the auctioneer
computes Wt. Using (3) the auctioneer computes Ait for all i. Using (4) the auction is
then stopped or continues to round t+1. The only remaining question is the computation
of t+1. We answer that by looking at the specic designs.
3.1 The Milgrom FCC Auction
The basic Milgrom FCC auction design requires only two new rules in addition to (1)-(5)
from above. First, only single-item bids are allowed. That means for all i, t
∑
k2K
xk = 1 for all (p, x) 2 N it . (6)
Second, the price vector t+1 is simply the high price from t. That is,
t+1k = pkif(p, x) 2 Wt and xk = 1. (7)
We let 1k = 0 for all k but one could allow 
1 to be any reserve prices.
The rules (1)-(7) fully describe what we have called the Milgrom FCC design.
3.2 The RAD Design
This design represents a serious attempt to make package bidding work in a multi-object,
iterative auction. We believe that it is unlikely to represent the ultimate, \optimal" multi-
object auction,21 but, as will be seen below, its performance signicantly improves on the
Milgrom design and others. It performs as well as the continuous AUSM with a standby
queue, something no iterative auction had done till now (See Kwasnica et al. (1998)).
The key dierence in design from the Milgrom approach is that package bids are
allowed and a new pricing rule is introduced. Allowing package bids is accomplished by
19We leave the explanation of where these prices come from to the following subsections.
20M could be altered over time, but we forego that degree of freedom in this paper.
21In the conclusion we indicate at least three potential problems with this design which could aect
performance adversely.
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simply eliminating (6) as a restriction on new bids. Pricing is a bit more subtle. Let
Lt = Bt n Wt be the losing bids at t. We would ideally like a set of prices, t, such that
pj =
∑
k2K 
t
kx
j
k for all j 2 Wt and pj 
∑
k2K 
t
kx
j
k for all j 2 Lt. This is certainly true
of the Milgrom prices (7). However, once package bidding is allowed and (1) is used to
decide winners, it can no longer be guaranteed that such prices exist. So we must turn
to an \approximation" of the ideal. To compute prices t+1, we begin by solving the
following problem:22
min
t,Z,g
Z (8)
Subject to
∑
k2K
tkx
j
k = p
j for all bj = (pj, xj) 2 Wt
∑
k2K
tkx
j
k + g
j  pj for all bj = (pji , xj) 2 Lt
0  gj  Z for all bj 2 Lt
t  0.
At the prices t there may be some losing bids for which
∑
k2K 
t
kx
j
k  pj, falsely
signaling a possible winner. Such is the nature of package bidding. On the positive
side, such bids can be resubmitted if pj − (∑k2K tkxjt) is large enough. Further, (8) is
designed to minimize the number of such bids. In fact, if \ideal" prices exist, they will
be the solution and g = 0 for all bj 2 Lt.
The prices from (8) may, however, not be unique. Also, it may be possible to further
lower some of the gj which, in a rst solution, satisfy 0  gj  Z. So, to complete
the computation of t, a sequence of iterations of (8) is performed. We lexicographically
lower as many gj as possible. The formalities are provided in Appendix B. But, even
this may not produce unique prices. So next, we try to maximize the minimum prices23
which satisfy the constraints of (8). We do this to help counter the threshold problem.
The purpose of prices is to convey information to bidders about opportunities in the
next bidding round. Otherwise, any prices such that
∑
k2K 
t
kx
j
k = p
j for all winners
would suce. Because of package bidding a winner might be a bid of $10 for items 1
and 2. There may be no single bidder willing to pay more than $10 for both items but
there may be two bidders who together are. Suppose bidder A values item 1 at $ 8 and
bidder B values item 2 at $ 5. Further, suppose they had bid, respectively, $6 for 1 and
$3 for 2 in the last round. Then RAD would produce prices of 1 = $6 and 2 = $4.
This signals that there was a bid of $ 6 for 1. Further, the lowest price of items in a
winning bid, $ 4 in this case, signals the minimum necessary to bid in order to combine
with another loser to beat this winner. Combining these prices with the minimum bid
increment rule and eligibility based stopping provides information to, and puts pressure
on, potential \free riders" to bid for it or lose it.
22For those whose eyes glaze over at the sight of linear programs, we have included, in Appendix C,
the instructions with which we explained pricing to the subjects.
23This is equivalent to minimizing the maximum prices.
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As the reader will see in the data below, this combination of pricing and stopping rule
work very well together to eliminate strategic problems caused by the threshold problem.
Changing the Milgrom FCC design to allow package bidding with the pricing rule in
(8) generates a signicant increase in performance in environments with multiple objects
with complementarities. There is also no degradation of performance in environments
with no complementarities.
4 The Experimental Design
The environment used as a testbed for all auctions in this paper was created by combining
features of the spatial tting environment originally utilized by Ledyard et al. (1997) and
an additive environment. The ve participants were allowed to bid on ten heterogeneous
items labeled a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, and j. Bidder values for the rst six items were highly
nonadditive. Five separate sets (periods) of valuations were determined in the following
manner:
 The single-item packages, (a, b, c, d, e, f), had integer values drawn independently
form a uniform distribution with support [0, 10].
 The two-item packages,(fa, bg, fa, cg, . . . fe, fg), took integer values drawn inde-
pendently from a uniform distribution with support [20, 40].
 The three-item packages, (fa, b, cg, . . . fd, e, fg), had integer values determined in-
dependently by draws from a uniform distribution with support [140, 180].
 The value for the six-item package, fa, b, c, d, e, fg, was drawn uniformly from
[140, 180].
For each period, a total of 25 unique packages and valuations were generated by the
previous steps. Each bidder was given ve packages. In general, a combination of two
three-item packages formed the largest total value. However, the optimal package cong-
uration is typically overlapped by other competing packages. Therefore, these valuations
were meant to be a dicult test of any allocation mechanism. An indicator of that dif-
culty is that, in period 3 and 5 competitive equilibrium prices did not exist.24 Table 2
provides a sample set of spatial tting valuations (Period 2). In this example, the ecient
package combination is fa, b, dg for bidder 2 and fc, e, fg for bidder 5.
The valuations for the remaining four objects (g, h, i, j) were determined in an ad-
ditive manner. Each bidder had a valuation for each individual object between 40 and
180. If a bidder obtained more than one of these items, they received the sum of their
valuations. Therefore, competitive equilibrium prices lie between the highest and the
second highest valuation for each of the objects. These items were added to the spatial
24Competitive equilibrium prices are those such that the demand for each object is exactly the number
available (one in this case).
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Table 2: Values in a Spatial Fitting Example
Bidder 1 Packages: f cd bcf bde abe
Values: 9 22 128 130 120
Bidder 2 Packages: b df ae af abd
Values: 8 28 24 27 130
Bidder 3 Packages: c a d bd abf
Values: 2 3 8 20 119
Bidder 4 Packages: e abc adf bdf aef
Values: 10 117 112 128 125
Bidder 5 Packages: cf de cef bef abcdef
Values: 29 25 117 125 142
Table 3: Experiments Completed
Institution
Period Milgrom FCC RAD
1 3 5
2 3 5
3 5 5
4 3 5
5 3 5
tting environment for two reasons. First, since we suspected that under some institu-
tions bidders would be making net losses on the rst six objects, these objects would
serve as a convenient tool to ensure that bidders overall payo for the auctions was not
negative.25 Second, performance in these markets could provide a quick check of any
auction’s prociency in the easiest of environments.
The experiments were conducted using members of the Caltech community, primarily
undergraduates. Five subjects participated in each experimental session. In each session,
the number of auctions (or periods) actually completed varied. No session lasted longer
than three hours. Subjects received new redemption value sheets at the beginning of
each new auction. Bidder values were kept private. At the end of each auction, subjects
calculated their prots and converted the token values into dollars. Subjects were paid
privately at the end of the experimental session. In addition to participating in a practice
auction, all subjects had prior experience with the general auction format; they had all
participated in training sessions which utilized simplied auction rules and environments.
Instructions for the experiments can be found in Appendix C.26
A total of 42 experimental auctions were completed in 15 experimental sessions. Ta-
ble 3 reports the distribution of experiments across the two mechanisms and the ve
parameter sets.
25In reality, in many test of the FCC auction even these four additive objects were not enough.
26Instructions for the Milgrom auction are similar to those for the RAD auction mechanism. They
may be found at http:nnhss.caltech.edun~akwasnexperiments.html.
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5 Performance Measures
When choosing an auction design, a variety of criteria and measures may be used. In
general there will be trade-os between these measures and dierent auctions will perform
better depending on which measure one focuses on. For example, high eciency can
sometimes come at the cost of seller revenue and the time to complete the auction.
5.1 Eciency
Eciency is the most obvious choice of a performance measure. It was, in fact, to be
the original primary policy goal of the FCC PCS auction design. In any environment,
each bidder has a set of valuations which can be indicated as a (payo) function V i :
f0, 1gK ! R where V i(y) is bidder i0s redemption value, the amount the experimenter
will pay i, if they hold the combination of objects indicated by y. The maximal possible
total valuation is:
V  = max
I∑
i=1
V i(yi)
subject to
N∑
i=1
yik  1 k = 1, ., Kyi 2 f0, 1gK .
So if fy^igIi=1 is the nal allocation chosen by an iterative auction, the eciency of
that auction is ∑
i V
i(y^i)
V 
It is true (see Ledyard et al. (1997)) that the absolute level of eciency can be deceptive
since one can increase the percentage by simply doubling the agents’ values and leaving
the allocation unchanged. However, we will only use eciency to compare performance
across institutions in the same environment. So this is not a problem for us.
5.2 Revenue
If the mechanism designer happens to also be the auctioneer, he may be interested in
maximizing revenue: the sum of the nal bids. Since that maximum can vary signicantly
across environments, we used the percentage of the maximum possible revenue actually
captured by the seller as our measure of seller revenue. This statistic also measures the
amount of the maximum surplus captured by the seller.
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5.3 Bidder Prot
Bidder prot is another possible measure. With the presence of signicant complemen-
tarities, some auction mechanisms can cause some bidders to lose money (Bykowsky et al.
(1995)). A high probability of losses can lead to a variety of performance failures. Bidders
may be unwilling to participate in auctions they know they are likely to lose money in.
They may not bid aggressively and thereby cause eciency losses. Losses may also lead
a bidder to default on payment contracts which in turn undermines the credibility of the
auction. Increasing the surplus to the bidders can, however, conflict with a goal of high
revenue for the seller. All other things being equal (including eciency of the auction),
any increase in bidder prots must come at the expense of seller revenue. Therefore,
while it may not be clear why a designer would want to maximize bidder protability,
there does seem to be a compelling reason to avoid bidder losses. In all of the iterative
auctions whose tests we report on in this paper, a bidder’s prot will be
V i(y^it) −   y^i
where  is the vector of nal prices.
5.4 Length
When analyzing iterative auctions the length of the auction becomes a relevant concern.27
In this paper we measure auction length by the number of iterations (rounds) before the
auction is completed. Increased iterations can reduce seller protability because each
iteration typically has some xed administrative cost as well as the possible opportunity
costs of foregone rental revenue on the objects. Obviously, one could hold an auction in
one iteration as a sealed bid auction. But there is a possible trade-o between auction
length and eciency. Increased iterations may allow high value bidders to nd the
right package thus increasing eciency. An auction that ends very quickly may lead to
inecient allocations.
Since the spatial tting and additive environments were run simultaneously, the num-
ber of iterations until the entire auction closed is not necessarily an accurate performance
measure of auction length for either environment. In order to determine the auction
length for the additive markets, we identied the round that these four markets would
have closed if there was no spatial tting markets. For example, an auction may have
lasted 12 iterations. However, the last new bid on any of the additive valued items oc-
curred in the sixth iteration. Then, the auction for the additive environment would be
said to have ended in iteration seven since, assuming bidding would have been identical,
the auction for just the additively valued objects would have ended after no new bids
were placed in the seventh round. While it is possible that the addition of the spatial
tting environment may have altered bidding behavior on the additive items, and vice
27The FCC PCS auctions have been criticized for the time it took to complete one auction. The D,E,
and F Block PCS Auction lasted 276 rounds.
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versa, this measure seems to be a reasonable proxy for the speed of the auction in the
additive environment. The same procedure was used for the spatial tting environment.
By necessity, the auction length for one environment is identical to the length of the
actual auction.
We turn now to reporting the experimental results.
6 Results
In this section, we compare the performance of the RAD mechanism with three other
auction designs: the Milgrom FCC auction, AUSM, and, the Single Item Allocation
Mechanism (SIAM). We have already discussed the FCC and AUSM designs. The SIAM
design is thoroughly described in Kwasnica et al. (1998). It represents the simplest
version of an iterative packaging auction where prices t are determined by actual single-
item bids. We include the comparisons here for completeness.
6.1 Results From the Spatial Fitting Testbed
1 Conclusion RAD yields eciency at least as high as other designs tested.
The average auction eciency across periods under the Milgrom FCC design was 66.95%,
signicantly lower than the average eciencies of 90.42% for the RAD design. RAD also
yielded an average eciency which was signicantly higher than that obtained with
SIAM (84.02%). The continuous AUSM obtained an average eciency of 94% which is
not signicantly dierent from the results for RAD. Table 4 gives the results of Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum pairwise comparisons of these three institutions. The fact that
all three auctions which allow package bidding drastically outperform the FCC design
suggests an obvious conclusion.
2 Conclusion Package bidding signicantly increases eciency.
These results appear to provide compeling evidence that package bidding is an essential
part of an auction if complementarities exist and one desires allocative eciency. As
further evidence of this, in only 4 out of 17 (24%) auctions does the Milgrom design lead
to full eciency as opposed to 20 out of 25 (80%) for RAD.
3 Conclusion Package bidding signicantly increases average bidder prots and reduces
individual losses.
When package bidding was not allowed (Milgrom FCC) bidders, as a whole, averaged
losses of $7.73 in each period for the markets with complementarities. However, in both
institutions where package bidding was permitted, bidders earned positive prots on
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Table 4: Spatial Fitting Auction Eciency Rank-Sum Test
SIAM AUSM RAD
Milgrom z = 2.23 z = 3.29 z = 3.55
α = .026 α = .000 α = .000
SIAM z = 1.98 z = 2.01
α = .050 α = .045
AUSM z = .332
α = .371
average. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum Test (Table 5) indicates that the level
of prots is signicantly higher in the RAD and SIAM designs than in the no packaging
auction. However, there is no signicant dierence in the level of prots in the SIAM and
RAD institutions. Total bidder prot averaged $4.23 in RAD and $3.24 in SIAM. On an
individual level, 30 out of 85 (35%) bidders lost money under the Miglrom FCC auction.
Under RAD, only 4 out of 125 (3.2%) bidders ended an auction with losses. Under the
SIAM design 7 out of 110 (6.4%) bidders ended with losses.28
While the number of bidders with losses decreased when package bidding was allowed,
it is surprising that any bidders made losses. Without package bidding losses are to be
expected. In order to win a package, bidders must put themselves at risk of only obtaining
part of the package. However, when package bidding is allowed, bidders have no incentive
to bid for packages above their values. After closely examining the data from experiments
where bidders were allowed to bid on packages, we have some conjectures as to why losses
occurred. First, eligibility encouraged bidders to bid on as many items as possible. It
is possible that bidders thought that an easy and relatively risk free method to keep
their eligibility high was to place small bids on single item packages. They may have
thought that it was very likely that someone would value the object above their small bid
and therefore they would not lose money from this bid. However, at times, these small
bids were suciently large to be winners. In a few experiments, we observed behavior
consistent with this rationale. The strategic implications of \eligibility" remains to be
seriously studied. However, it is clear that it leads to bids which are inconsistent with
short-run value maximization. Second, if a bidder makes a mistake in bidding in early
iterations, it may be dicult to escape from it. For whatever reasons, bidders occasionally
placed bids incongruent with their valuations. A simple example of this occurs if a bidder
had a value of 100 for the package A,B,C, and a value of no more than 25 for any 2 item
subset. If that bidder intended to place a bid of 50 on A,B,C but, through negligence,
missed indicating C, they would have a bid of 50 on A,B yielding a loss of 25 if no one
ever bids higher.29 If those bids were suciently high, no other bidder would be able to
rescue them by out bidding them.30 One interesting but little studied aspect of practical
28Similar data is not currently available for AUSM.
29This actually happened to one of the authors during early software tests.
30However, under the iterative design, if a bidder realized his mistake before the completion of that
round, he could delete the bid. It is easy to imagine that a similar error could be made in a continuous
auction without any hope for correction.
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Figure 1: Spatial Fitting { Average Eciency Per Period
auction design is the prevention of \typos": unintentional errors in data entry. The hard
part is separating \typos" from strategic moves later claimed to be mistakes. We do not
pursue this here.
Table 5: Spatial Fitting { Total Bidder Prots Rank-Sum Test
SIAM RAD
Milgrom z = 2.76 z = 2.83
α = .006 α = .005
SIAM z = 1.01
α = .310
4 Conclusion Auction length is shortest under RAD.
Auction length, measured as the number of iterations before completion of the auction,
was signicantly shorter in the institutions where package bidding was allowed. The
Milgrom auctions averaged 16.2 iterations in length as compared to 3.32 for RAD. There
is also a signicant dierence between the two iterative packaging institutions. The
average auction length for RAD was signicantly shorter than the 6.59 iterations for the
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ts Per Period
SIAM design (Table 6). In fact, it often took longer to complete the additive markets
than the spatial tting items(see Conclusion 9).
Table 6: Spatial Fitting { Auction Length Rank-Sum Test
SIAM RAD
Milgrom z = 3.97 z = 4.98
α = .000 α = .000
SIAM z = 4.04
α = .000
5 Conclusion Package bidding signicantly reduces revenues as a % of the maximum
possible to the seller. However, among package bidding designs, RAD does best.
A simple comparison of average seller revenue does not bear out signicant dierences
between auction institutions. But a comparison of seller’s revenue as a percentage of
maximum possible revenue demonstrates single-item only bidding institutions yield a
signicantly higher revenue percentage for the seller than any of the package bidding
mechanisms with an average across periods of 96.25% as compared to 79.4%, 73.3%,
and 71% for the RAD, SIAM and AUSM respectively. RAD does slightly out perform
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the SIAM auction with a 90% condence level (Table 7). RAD also yields signicantly
higher revenue than AUSM which implies that the RAD design minimizes the potential
trade-o between bidder prots and seller revenue.
Table 7: Spatial Fitting { Revenue Rank-Sum Test
SIAM AUSM RAD
Milgrom z = 3.39 z = 3.06 z = 2.88
α = .001 α = .001 α = .004
SIAM z = .150 z = 1.66
α = .440 α = .100
AUSM z = 1.62
α = .100
A strong caveat is necessary before one leaps to the conclusion that the Milgrom
auction is \best" for a seller. The result that the revenue percentage is high in Milgrom
auctions seems to be signicantly driven by the high level of bidder losses (see Conclu-
sion 3). A measure which identies this is the dierence between realized revenue as a
percentage of maximum possible revenue and the amount of losses as a percentage of the
maximum possible surplus. By subtracting the former by the later, we have a measure
of surplus captured by the auctioneer if a \default" option was allowed. Table 8 reports
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these calculations. While the package bid auctions are unaected, the Milgrom auction
is reduced to 67% which is now below that captured by the three other designs. Any
revenue above 66.95% (the average eciency), must be coming from bidder losses. In any
practical situation, if a bidder faces losses by accepting the items won, that bidder will
most likely default and not pay.31 This was not possible in our experiments, although
future tests could certainly include a \default option". It is reasonable to conjecture that
if we were to test the auctions with a zero losses option, the revenue percentage would
be closer to the level of eciency. The Milgrom auction revenue percentage which would
then be lower than the observed revenue percentages for auctions which allow package
bidding.32
6.2 Results from the Additive Testbed
In this section, we report on the results for the four objects which had additive valua-
tions for all bidders. In general, the ecient allocation would require only single item
bids among the additive objects. So package bids would occur only if bidders were at-
31An extreme example can be found in the FCC C Block auctions. See \Airwave Auctions Falter as
a Source of Funds for U.S." in The New York Times April 3, 1997.
32Imposing a zero loss rule could of course also signicantly aect bidder incentives.
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Table 8: Surplus Captured by the Seller
Revenue % Prot % Rev.-Losses
Milgrom 96% -29% 67%
SIAM 73% 11% 73%
AUSM 71% 23% 71%
RAD 79% 11% 79%
tempting a sophisticated strategy33 to capture a larger share of the objects. But this
rarely happened.
6 Conclusion Package bids only rarely occur among the winning bids in the additive
environment.
In only 3 of 25 RAD auctions do the nal winning bids contain packages of additive
objects. Further, in these 3 auctions the nal allocations involve package bids across ad-
ditive and other objects.34 Although bidders are clearly willing to bid on packages in the
additive environment, they are only rarely able to use this ability to their advantage as is
evidenced by the extremely high levels of eciency achieved in the additive environment.
7 Conclusion In the additive environment, under both designs eciency is very near
100%. There are no discernible dierences between the two auctions.
A 100% ecient auction indicates that all the possible gains from trade (surplus) have
been captured by someone (either bidders or the seller). As expected, both auctions
did quite well in terms of eciency in this environment. In most of the auctions, the
four objects were allocated to the highest valuing bidders: 20 of 25 (80%) for RAD and
15 of 17 (88%) auctions for the FCC auction. Both the AUSM and SIAM designs also,
generally, lead to high eciencies in the additive environment. 20 of 23 (87%) auctions for
SIAM were 100% ecient. There were no signicant dierences in the level of eciency
achieved by any of the mechanisms. Therefore, package bidding auctions, specically
RAD, do not seem to degrade auction performance in simple settings.
8 Conclusion In the additive environment, the two auction institutions yield similar
revenue to the seller.
In the additive environment, there was very little dierence in the revenue collected by
the seller under the two auction institutions. The FCC and RAD mechanisms averaged
69.96% and 71.96% of the maximum possible revenue respectively. A rank-sum test
33Such a strategy might be to create an articial threshold which would yield a possible free rider
problem for others allowing the bidder to get the items even if it were not an ecient allocation.
34This occurred under SIAM only once. Under SIAM, since it is then impossible to separate the
revenue results for the spatial tting and additive environment, we do not report these data in our
revenue comparisons. However, under RAD, we used the nal prices to estimate the portion of the bid
occurring in the additive environment.
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also showed no signicant dierence between the observed revenues. The SIAM design
achieved revenue of 68.84% for the additive markets. Again, it was not signicantly
dierent than either the Milgrom FCC or RAD auctions.
9 Conclusion In the additive environment, auction length is shortest under the RAD
design.
The average auction length in the additive environment was shorter for both the pack-
aging auctions, and RAD yielded lengths that were signicantly shorter than both the
others (Milgrom and SIAM). The average auction length under the Milgrom FCC auction
was 11.7 iterations. However, when package bidding was allowed the average length fell
to 8.4 under the SIAM rules and 6.1 for RAD.35 Table 9 reports the results of rank-sum
test which demonstrate that both package bid rules yield signicantly shorter auctions
in the additive environment. As before, there is no direct comparison with the speed of
AUSM.
Table 9: Additive { Auction Length Rank-Sum Test
SIAM RAD
Milgrom z = 2.54 z = 4.67
α = .02 α = .000
SIAM z = 2.84
α = .005
7 Conclusions and Open Issues
The experimental test results point to two clear conclusions:
i. The option to bid for packages clearly improves performance in dicult environ-
ments, and does not degrade performance in simple environments.
ii. The RAD redesign of the Milgrom FCC rules outperforms both the iterative Mil-
grom and SIAM designs as well as the continuous AUSM with queue.
The general principle that package bidding is an important option for multi-object auc-
tions in environments with signicant complementarities is rearmed by the evidence.36
Auctions which only allow bidding on single items almost always exhibit lower levels of
allocative eciency and higher bidder losses. When auctions are run in an iterative mode,
35These results are, of course, confounded by the fact that the length the additive part of the auction
is the round after which no new bid is made on an additive object. This is not necessarily independent
of the existence of the spatial part of the auction.
36Other papers providing support include Banks et al. (1989), Ledyard et al. (1997), Kwasnica et al.
(1998).
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single-item only bidding can also lead to much longer auctions. The only redeeming fea-
ture of these auctions seems to be their revenue generating capabilities. Unfortunately,
much of that revenue comes from losses to bidders as opposed to increased surplus extrac-
tion. This may be acceptable in the short run. However, if the design is used repeatedly,
bidders will learn to avoid these losses, and eciency and revenue will ultimately suer.
But we have gone further here than simply asserting that package bidding is sensi-
ble. We have provided a new auction design, RAD, which clearly outperforms others.
Relative to the Milgrom FCC design, RAD produces higher eciency, higher revenue,
higher bidder prots and a much quicker time to completion. It even produces similar
eciencies to and higher revenues than the continuous AUSM with a standby queue.
Since RAD uses a pricing rule instead of a queue to mitigate the threshold problem, it
appears to be no more complex from a bidder’s point of view than the Milgrom auction
and signicantly simpler than the continuous AUSM. Finally, there is no evidence of
degradation in performance when RAD is used in simple, additive environments.
Why do we think RAD worked so well? We believe it is the decentralizing influence of
the prices. Under the SIAM and Milgrom FCC mechanisms, prices were only calculated
from single item bids. Therefore, if bidders were not bidding above their valuations, in
this environment, it is guaranteed that the single item prices would be much lower than
the actual winning bids for the packages. If we consider the sample parameters given
in Table 2, the maximum prices for bidders unwilling to expose themselves to potential
losses are: 3, 8, 2, 8, 16, and 9 for the rst six items.37 The ‘competitive’ prices, however,
are 38, 49, 30, 43, 38, and 49.38 If we examine the data for this parameter set (period
2), we nd that this dierence in prices is prevalent experimentally. Figure 5 lists the
average prices under both SIAM and RAD. In general, the SIAM prices are closer to the
zero exposure prices.39 The RAD prices are closer to the competitive prices. In general
we would expect nal prices to be somewhat lower than the competitive prices due to the
bid increment requirement which made the true price higher than that reported here.
Once the mandatory bid increment of three francs is considered, the RAD prices are
not signicantly dierent than the competitive prices for ve of the six objects. In the
RAD mechanism, prices are calculated using all bids. Therefore, in general, they will
more closely represent the level of competition for an item. Since the prices are typically
calculated in order to indicate the level of competition below the winning packages, they
can indicate to bidders markets where bidding is thin. Thus, prices should aid in nding
an appropriate t.
37These are simply the maximal single item values. The only way prices under the SIAM and FCC
designs could be higher is if a someone bid on a single item above their value.
38Competitive prices are the set of prices which leave only one demander for each object. In other
words, combinations of these prices are greater than or equal to valuations for all packages except the
ecient ones.
39The fact that the prices were often above the zero loss prices indicates that bidder were willing to
make bids that could’ve led to losses. Their motivation may have been to use the single item bids in
order to signal willingness to bid on an object in hopes of nding a ‘t’ with another bidder.
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It would seem that the RAD design would be a natural candidate for use as a multi-
object iterative auction in its current form. However, in spite of the excellent performance
in our tests, there are at least three problem areas that might be considered for redesign.
The rst, and simplest to x, is a result of the eligibility rule. If bidders have budgets
for items, they may nd themselves bidding for and even winning items which have
little value to them simply to preserve eligibility. While this problem has generally been
recognized even when there is no package bidding, we know of no papers which purport
to provide a solution. There is, nevertheless, a solution which is straight-forward: the use
of \OR" bids in an iterative auction. Bidders would be allowed to place a bid saying \I
bid $1000 for A,B and C OR I bid $800 for D and E". The appropriate constraints would
be added to the allocation problem (1) and the rest of the mechanism would be left as
is. This could be done to the Milgrom FCC rules as well as to RAD and others. OR bids
may appear to increase a bidder’s problem complexity a bit, but such bids do eliminate
the anxiety and confusion raised by the need to nd \safe places" to preserve eligibility.
We have not tested the eect of adding OR bids to the RAD design, something which
should clearly be done before our recommendation is adopted in practice.
A second problem with the RAD design is that, although the pricing rule seems to
guide and coordinate small bidders to solve the threshold problems, it can also orphan
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some bidders at early stages even through they belong in the ecient allocation. An
example will illustrate. Suppose in round 5 there are 4 bids submitted
Table 10:
bid # $ Items
1 99 ABC
2 75 AB
3 75 AC
4 75 BC
Under the RAD design bid #1 wins and the prices40 are (cbPic) = (33, 33, 33).
Now suppose there is a bidder who is willing to pay 30 for A. Had they bid 28 for A in
round 5 they would have been a winning bid along with bid #4. But now they can’t bid
since a > 30. This may lower eciency. There are several features of RAD that work
against such orphaning. First, if this bidder had bid in round 5, they would not have
been orphaned. So aggressive participation helps. Second, suppose in round 6, bid #3 is
not resubmitted, but 1,2, and 4 are. Then 1 still wins and  = (24, 51, 24).41 If it gets
to this stage our bidder for A can reenter the fray if they still have the eligibility to do
so. Of course, if the auction stops in round 5, which it will if there are no additional new
bids, it will end at an inecient allocation. We do have an additional design feature to
address this problem but will defer its explication until we have seriously tested it.
The last potential problem with RAD could not arise in our laboratory tests but
could arise if RAD were scaled up to be used in the eld. In the lab we used 5 bidders
and 10 items. In practice one could have thousands of items and thousands of bidders.
Scaling up creates the real possibility that the allocation problem (1) could take a very
long time42 to solve in any given round. So all the gains in time to complete would be
lost because of the complexity of (1). There are a number of design changes that can
address this problem including replacing (1) with a less ambitious target. We have not
yet tested them experimentally but we consider this a prime area of future research.
40Notice that these are not separating prices which is what causes a problem.
41These are separating prices. This also shows that prices are not necessarily monotonically increasing
(since 24 < 33). The sum of prices, however, is.
42One can create problems which would take weeks to solve on supercomputers.
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Appendix A The Exposure and Threshold
Problems
In the design of multi-object auctions, two signicant impediments to eciency have been
identied by theorists: exposure and thresholds. The exposure problem is an undesirable
feature of auctions with no package bidding. It tends to disadvantage bidders wanting
multiple items. The threshold problem is an undesirable feature of auctions with package
bidding. It tends to disadvantage bidders wanting single items.
A.1 The Exposure Problem
The exposure problem is simple to understand.43 It arises from the non-existence of
competitive prices because of the non-convexities created by complementarities. We use
an example with three bidders and two objects.
Table 11: Exposure Example
Packages
Bidder A B AB
1 a a 2a + b
2 a a 2a + c
3 d a a + d
Assume a + b > d > a, and b > c. Then the ecient allocation gives AB to 1. How
might bidding proceed with only single-item bids? Assume all bid increments are equal.
We would expect prices to initially increase to PA = PB = a, marked 1 on Figure 6. If
bidder 3 increases the bid on A to something greater than a, then bidders 1 and 2 must
decide whether to bid above their stand alone values for A. If they don’t, the allocation
will be something like 1 gets B and 3 gets A. This is inecient, although one could not
tell that simply from the prices PA > a and PB = a.
If either 1 or 2 (or both) continue bidding, they become exposed to losses. The auction
will proceed to point 2 where PA = PB = a + c2 . At this point bidder 2 will drop out.
Should bidder 1 continue? If 1 does, then bidding proceeds to point 3 where PA = a+b− c2
and PB = a+ c2 . At this point, if bidder 3 raises the bid on A, which 3 should do, 1 faces
a dilema: drop out or continue.
If bidder 1 drops out at point 3, then 1 only gets B and loses −(a−a− c2) = c2 . Bidder
3 gets A and the allocation is inecient. But 1 can calculate that if he bids for A at a
price less than a+ b then 1 will lose less than c2 since a−PB < 2a+ b−PB −PA whenever
PA < a + b, no matter what 1 pays for B. So by continuing, 1 makes lower losses than
by stopping. So unless 1 believes someone will rescue her by bidding for B, 1 should
continue on to point 4. In this auction, the bidding will stop at point 3. Bidder 1 will
43Examples can be found in Bykowsky et al. (1995) and Milgrom (1997).
27
Figure 6: Exposure Example
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win AB, the ecient allocation, and 1 will prot by 2a+ b − (a+ c2 + d). Unfortunately,
if d > a + b − c2 then this is a loss for bidder 1. Only the auctioneer makes money.
The exposure problem is a potential pitfall for any participant for whom V (AB) >
V (A) + V (B). V (AB) − A(B) is the maximum they would be willing to pay for A if
they know they have B. V (AB) − V (A) is maximum they would be willing to pay for
B if they have A. If these sum to more than V (AB), they are potentially vulnerable.
Depending on how bidders react to the problem, stop at point 1 or continue, the auction
can produce ineciencies or losses, neither of which is particularly desirable.
Some analysts may attempt to infer, from existing data, whether exposure was prob-
lem. However,notice that if participants never reveal their values there is no way for the
analyst to know for sure after an auction is over that 1 even faced an exposure problem.
Dropping out at point 1 is consistent with a world in which there are no synergies (b = 0).
Staying in to point 4 is consistent with a world where b > a − d − c2 and 1 does not lose.
It is also consistent with a world in which V (B) > a + c2 , V (A) > d and there are no
synergies.
It is easy to see that package bidding will cure the exposure the problem. At point
1, bidder 1 would bid only for AB. This would continue to point 2 where 1 wins and the
action stops. 1 wins AB, the ecient outcome, and pays 2a + c.
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A.2 The Threshold Problem
We have just seen that package bidding can help keep the exposure problem under control.
Unfortunately package bidding creates its own problem: thresholds.44 The problem is
easy to understand. We use an example from Milgrom (1997) with bidders, 2 items, and
budget contraints.45
Table 12: Threshold Example
Packages
Bidder A B AB Budget
1 4 3
2 4 3
3 1 +  1 +  2 +  2
Table 13: Threshold Game
2 Raises by
1 Raises by 0 1/2 3/4
0 (0,0) (0,0) (314 , 2
1
2)
1/2 (0,0) (234 , 2
3
4) (2
3
4 , 2
1
2)
3/4 (212 , 3
1
2) (2
1
2 , 2
3
4) (2
1
2 , 2
1
2)
Under package bidding we could arrive at a round of the auction in which 3 is the
current high bidder, bidding 2 for AB and beating bids of 3/4 by 1 for A and 3/4 by 2
for B. If 1 and 2 know this then they have to decide whether to rebid and by how much.
This yields a game that looks like Table 13 where (x,y) is (1’s prot, 2’s prot). There
are 3 pure strategy Nash equilibria with raises of (0,3/4), (3/4,0), and (1/2, 1/2). In
all equilibria the outcome is ecient. But there is a coordination problem: If 1 assumes
(0,3/4) and 2 assumes (3/4, 0), they end up at (0,0) and lose. 3 wins the item, and an
inecient outcome occurs.46 Will this happen?
If 1 and 2 are Bayesian game theorists interested only in the current stages the answer
is yes. Suppose 2 believes 1’s value for A is V 1A  [0, 4] and 1 believes 2’s value for B is
V 2B  [0, 4] and this is common knowledge. 1’s strategy is b1(V 1A) and 2’s is b2(V 2B). 1’s
payo is V 1A − b1(V 1A) if b1(V 1A) + b2(V 2B)  4 and is 0 otherwise. So 1’s expected utility is
[V 1A − b1]P [b2(v2B)  4 − b1] = [V 1A − b1][1 − F (4 − b1)]
44We originally identied this problem in Banks et al. (1989). Milgrom (1997) calls it the free
rider problem. While this is catchy, it is inappropriate. Free riding was identied in public good
problems where it is a dominant strategy not to contribute. The problem with package bidding is more
appropriately identied with games with multiple equilibria, such as public goods with thresholds. Here
there are no dominant strategies to overcome just a coordination problem. We have thus chosen the
more appropriate name.
45Milgrom (1997) uses this to analyze a proposed design for the FCC. That design is signicantly
dierent from the package bidding auction we propose in this paper and is also dierent from AUSM as
tested in Banks et al. (1989) or Ledyard et al. (1997).
46It is often the case that cheap talk can help here. That is certainly the nding in many public goods
experiments with thresholds. See Ledyard (1995).
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Assume V 1A and V
2
B are distributed identically and independently and uniform on [0,4].
Then b1 = 12V
1
A , b
2 = 12V
2
B are equilibrium strategies. It is easily possible that V
1
A + V
2
B >
2 +  > 2 > 12(V
1
A + V
2
B). 3 wins even though it is inecient.
Of course an iterative auction does not require a one time decision. It allows for a
form of bargaining or coordination. Under complete information, with an activity rule
and minimum increments one can easily construct reasonable strategies for 1 and 2 in
our example where, to preserve eligibility, they constantly increase their bids by the
minimum increment. Eventually they will displace 3 and win. Of course whether and
how this happens depends crucially on the details of the auction.
A.3 Summary
Simultaneous auctions without package bidding can suer from the exposure problem.
This can cause either bidder losses or low eciencies. Simultaneous auctions with package
bidding can suer from the threshold problem. This can cause low eciencies. Neither is
a fatal flaw but each raises the same question. Can an auction be designed to eliminate
the problem? For example, the withdrawal rule in the FCC auctions was designed to
minimize the exposure problem while retaining single-item bids.47 In this paper, we
provide a new design to minimize the threshold problem while eliminating the exposure
problem with package bids.
Appendix B Resolving Price Ambiguity
In Section 3.2, we indicated that the RAD auction pricing algorithm (8) might not yield
a unique price vector.48 We use the following routines to eliminate that ambiguity. Let
g,, and Z solve (8). If Z = 0 then go to problem (10) below. If Z > 0, let
J = fj 2 Lt j Z = gjg. If J = Lt then go to (10) below. Otherwise,
min
t,Z,g
Z (9)
Subject to
∑
k2K
tkX
j
k = p
j for all bj = (pj, xj) 2 Wt
∑
k2K
tkX
j
k + g
j = pj for all bj = (pji , x
j) 2 J
∑
k2K
tkX
j
k + g
j = pj for all bj = (pji , x
j) 2 Lt n J
47See Porter (1997) for an analysis of the eect of a withdrawal rule.
48An alternative approximation would minimize
∑
j(g
j)2 which would avoid iteration. We chose to
stick with linear programs for computational simplicity and a desire to minimize the number of bids
missed rather than the total size of the miss.
30
0  gj  Z for all bj 2 Lt n J
t  0.
Let Z^, g^, ^ be the solution to (9). If Z^ = 0 go to 10 below. Otherwise, let J^ = fj j Z^ =
g^jg. If J [ J^ = Lt then go to problem (10) below. Otherwise, let J = J [ J^ and go to
(9) again.
When the iteration on (9) is complete we will have prices which approximate our
\ideal" but not always obtainable prices. They may still not be unique. So, we go
through a sequence of iterations which eliminate non-uniqueness and which create prices
to guide bidders to solve the threshold problem. Let Z^, g^, ^ be the solution from the last
iteration of (9). Let K^ = K.
maxY (10)
subject to
∑
k2K
tkx
j
k = p
j for all (pj, xj) 2 Wt
∑
k2K
tkx
j
k + g
j = pj for all (pj, xj) 2 Lt
tk  Y for all k 2 K^. (11)
Let Y , solve (10). Let K = fk 2 K j tk = Y g. Let ~K = K^ n K. If ~K 6= ;, return
to (10) and solve it replacing (11) with
tk  Y for all k 2 ~K
tk = 
t
k for all k 2 K n ~K.
When ~K = ;, we are done and the prices  = t+1. These are unique, approximate the
ideal prices, and provide signals about thresholds.
Appendix C Instructions
You are about to participate in an economics experiment in which you will earn money
based on the decisions you make. All earnings you make in the experiment are yours to
keep.
1. All values and prices will be stated in francs. Each franc you earn can be converted
into US currency at the rate specied on your Redemption Value Sheet.
2. We will be conducting a market in which you can buy any of the 10 items. You
can only buy the items{not sell them. The items are denoted A-J.
3. The market will be broken up into a series of rounds. You only earn francs when
the market closes, not for each round.
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4. When the market closes you will ll out your Accounting Sheet and a monitor will
verify your earnings.
The experiment may have more than one period. Each period will consist of a series
of rounds. During each round you may bid on items. At the end of each round, the high
bid for each item will be displayed to everyone. The bidder with the highest bid for each
item is the temporary winner of that item. After the successful bids are displayed, a
new round will begin during which you may choose to try to gain or maintain ownership
of any item. We will continue this process until the temporary ownership of each item
remains the same for 2 rounds.
C.1 Redemption Value Sheet
You will have a redemption value sheet for each period in the experiment. This sheet
lists your values for each of the items A-J. Your values are private information. Please do
not reveal them to anyone. At the end of the period the owner of each item will receive
francs for the amount of their value of the owned item, less the amount that was bid for
that item in the last round of the period.
For example, If Bidder 3 has a redemption value sheet of
A 17
B 36
C 22
and Bidder 3 had the highest bid for item B in the last round with the high bid = 30
francs, then Bidder 3 will receive 6 francs for the period.
For each new period you will receive a new redemption value sheet. Your values and
your conversion rate may change.
C.2 Submitting an Order
You submit bids in the ’Make a Bid’ window. You select the item(s) you would like to
bid on, and indicate the amount that you wish to bid for the item(s). You may submit a
bid for a single item, for example, A= 100. You may also submit bids for multiple items
at the same time, for example, ABC=200. This would mean 200 for owning all three
items, it is not a bid of 200 for each individual item. You may make as many bids in
each round as your eligibility permits.
32
C.3 Eligibility
To encourage active bidding there is a "use it or lose it" rule. In the rst round you can
bid for any and all items. In each subsequent round, you will be allowed to bid only on
as many items you had active bids on in the previous round. An active bid is any bid
that is considered by the solver in computing the solution of that round. It is a standing
bid (a high bid from the last round) or a newly placed bid.
The maximum number of items you are allowed to have in all of your active bids in a
round is called your eligibility. Thus, your eligibility at the beginning of the period is 10.
Your eligibility in round 12 is exactly the number of items in your active bids in round
11.
How is eligibility computed?
Suppose that at the end of round 1 you had one high bid in the solution: A=50.
Further you had submitted 2 more bids of B=43 and C=17 which did not become high
bids. You did not bid on any other items. Your eligibility in round 2 will be 3. This
means that you can bid on a total of 3 items in round 2.
Your eligibility will be displayed in the round results. The computer would indicate
that you have a free eligibility of 2 and that you have a high bid eligibility of 1.
You may use the 1 unit of high bid eligibility to bid on item A. If you do not increase
your bid for A you will not lose this part of your eligibility in round 2. Either you will
still have the high bid and retain the 1 unit or someone will beat your high bid and you
will be given a normal unit of eligibility for round 3.
Your 2 units of free eligibility can be used on any other items. The computer will
indicate that you may use these 2 units on items: B C D E F G H I J. Note, you are not
limited to selecting items B and C to use your eligibility. You may choose any 2 items
for which to submit bids.
So a person with the above described eligibility might choose to submit bids like:
Bid 1: A=60
Bid 2: CG=75
Bid 3: CA=52
Bid 4: ACG=100
Bid 5: C=90
Notice that even though you had eligibility of 3, you are able to submit any number of
bids. Eligibility only limits the number of items you may bid on, not the number of bids
that you may submit.
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C.4 The Solver
At the end of each round the solver will determine which bids are the temporary winning
bids. The solver selects the combination of bids which maximize the revenue to be
received.
Example:
At the end of round 1 the following bids have been submitted:
Bid 1: ABC = 200
Bid 2: A = 100
Bid 3: BC = 75
The temporary winning bid is, therefore, bid 1 since it beats 100+75 for A + BC.
In round 2 a participant who wants only AB can submit a bid of 150 for AB in
hopes that someone else will bid 51 or greater for item C. The solver would realize that
these two separate bids are greater than the bid for ABC even when the bids come from
dierent participants.
If you have a temporary winning bid at the end of a round, that bid will automatically
be resubmitted into the next rounds bids. You may not withdraw a temporary winning
bid. You do not need to resubmit that exact bid, although you have the option of beating
your own bid.
C.5 The Calculation of Prices
While the computer is calculating the temporary winning bids, it will also compute prices
for each item. These prices will determine the minimum prices in the next round.
The computer will rst try to calculate prices, one for each item, so they sum up to
the standing bids and are greater than any second highest bid.
Example 1:
Bid 1: A=30
Bid 2: B=10
Bid 3: C=21
a b c
prices 30 10 21
Example 2:
Bid 1: AB=30
Bid 2: C=8
Bid 3: ABC=39
a b c
prices 15 15 9
The standing bid is number 3 for ABC. Choosing it yields the highest revenue. The
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computer will calculate prices for items A,B,C that add up to 39 and so the prices for A
and B add up to at least 30 and the price of C is at least 8. If there are several possible
solutions then the computer will try to equalize the prices.
Example 3:
Bid 1: AB=30
Bid 2: BC=30
Bid 3: AC=30
Bid 4: ABC=39
a b c
prices 13 13 13
Here bid number 4 is the only standing bid. Following the rules we would need to nd
prices for ABC that add up to 39. But we also want the prices for A and B to add up to
at least 30, the prices for A and C to add to at least 30, and the prices for B and C to
add to at least 30. But that is not possible. When this happens, the computer will nd
prices that come as close as possible to meeting the rules. So it is possible that you will
have a bid that exceeds the minimum prices and yet is not a winning bid.
C.6 Minimum Bids
At the start of each round, a price for each item will be displayed by the computer. Your
bid for any package must be greater than the summation of the posted prices for each
item plus 3 francs for each item in the bid.
For example, suppose that prices are:
a b c
prices 10 23 176
Some bids that meet the minimum requirements are:
Bid 1: A=14
Bid 2: B=27
Bid 3: BC=206
C.7 Round Results
All the information that you need to make decisions in the second round and beyond
will be displayed in the round results. (It might be a good idea to keep an eye on your
valuation sheet as well.) At the end of each round the computer will make all of the
necessary calculations. The experiment monitor will let you know when the results are
ready.
C.8 Bids Button
You can see your bids while the round is active.
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You can only see the bids for the current round and, again, you can only see your
own. The information you get will look like this:
Bidder B# P R $ a b c d e f g h i j
two 211 0 3 600 1
From now on you are all identied by your bidder number. Each bid is assigned a unique
bid ID. This is in the B# column. ’P’ is the period and ’R’ is the round in which that
bid was submitted. Under the dollar sign is the amount of the bid in francs. For each of
the items (A-J) there will be either a one or nothing. A one means that the item is part
of the package being bid for.
C.9 Stopping the Market
Each market will consist of a series of rounds. Each round will be no greater than two
minutes in length. The period will be closed at the end of round T if there is no change
in the temporary ownership between the end of round T-1 and the end of round T.
C.10 Special Notes
All bids must be in whole numbers (increments of size 1).
In general, you will probably discover a few menu options that have been grayed out.
You will not be able to use these options during this experiment.
If the bidding and trade windows disappear, you may type in the remaining window
with writing and return to restart the program. A login screen will appear. Type your
bidder number spelled out as your name (i.e. \one") and type the number \0" as your
password, then click on done. Your bidding and trade windows should reappear. If you
have any problems, please ask for assistance.
We do not oer any guarantees that the software will not crash. When the computer
crashes there may be some excitement, but there is no need to panic.
The rst few rounds will be practice rounds. Participants should learn and ask ques-
tions during this period.
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